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FAITH, PROBABILITY AND INFINITE PASSION:
RAMSEYIAN DECISION THEORY AND
KIERKEGAARD'S ACCOUNT
OF CHRISTIAN FAITH

Robert C. Koons

I propose an account of Christian faith, inspired by Kierkegaard's Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, according to which (1) belief involves a relation to
factual religious propositions, but (2) the strength of religious belief is measured, not by the degree of one's confidence in the truth of these propositions,
but rather by the degree to which the desirability of possible states of the
world is affected by whether they include the truth of these propositions. I
will defend this Kierkegaardian view by means of two mathematical tools
developed in the twentieth century: Frank Ramsey's decision theory, and
Robinson's theory of hyper-real numbers. I hope to show that Kierkegaard's
hypothesis that Christian faith is an infinite passion can be formulated precisely and shown to be mathematically coherent.

The logical treatment of the nature of religious belief (here I will concentrate
on belief in Christianity) has been distorted by the acceptance of a false
dilemma. On the one hand, many (e.g., Braithwaite, Hare) have placed the
significance of religious belief entirely outside the realm of intellectual cognition. According to this view, religious statements do not express factual
propositions: they are not made true or false by the ways things are. Religious
belief consists in a certain attitude toward the world, life, or other human
beings, or in what sorts of things one values. On the other hand, others (such
as Swinburne!) have taken religious belief to include (at least) being certain
of the truth of particular factual religious propositions. The strength of a
person's religious belief is identified with his degree of confidence in the
truth of those propositions, measured by the subjective probability which
those propositions have for that person. I propose a third alternative, according to which, (1) contrary to the first view, religious belief does involve a
relation to factual religious propositions, such as that God exists, that Jesus
was God and man, etc.,-propositions which are made true or false by the
way things actually are-but, (2) contrary to the second view, the strength of
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religious belief is measured, not by the degree of one's confidence 2 in the
truth of these propositions, but rather by the way in which the value or
desirability to oneself of the various ways the world could be is affected by
their including or not including the truth of these religious propositions. Thus,
religious belief does consist in what one values or prizes, not in what one
takes to be probably true, and yet this does not deprive the distinctive propositions of theology of their factual significance.
This third alternative was articulated by Kierkegaard, most explicitly in his
Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 3 I will defend this Kierkegaardian view
by means of two mathematical tools developed in the twentieth century:
decision theory, originating in the work of Frank Ramsey in the 30's, and the
theory of hyper-real numbers (also known as "non-standard analysis"), developed by Abraham Robinson in the 60's. I hope to show that Kierkegaard's
hypothesis that Christian faith is an infinite passion can be formulated precisely and shown to be mathematically coherent and scientifically plausible.
I will also point out a connection between this view and recent work on an
anti-foundationalism epistemology of religion by Alvin Plantinga, and I will
discuss the implications of this sort of theory of faith for Christian apologetics.

1. Ramseyian Decision Theory
In a paper entitled "Truth and Probability,"4 Frank P. Ramsey sought to
provide an operational or behavioral definition of the notion of 'degree of
belief' or 'degree of confidence of truth,' as well as the correlative notion of
'desirability' or 'utility' or 'subjective value.' Ramsey imagines an idealized
experimental set-up in which both the degrees of belief of the experimental
subject in various propositions, i.e., the subject's 'subjective probability function,' and the degrees of desirability which the subject attaches to the states
of affairs represented by such propositions, i.e., the subject's 'utility function,' may be measured. Ramsey imagines that the subject is confronted by
what he (the SUbject) believes to be an omnipotent and totally trustworthy
Bookie, who offers the subject a series of choices between pairs of options.
Some of these options come in the form of simple bets: e.g., an option which
might be offered to the subject might be: ex if p is true; otherwise, ~. If the
subject's choices conform to certain principles of mutual coherency (plus an
axiom of mathematical continuity, which, as we shall see later, is quite a big
assumption), then there exists a unique representation of the subject's state
of mind in terms of a probability function taking as its values real numbers
in the interval from 0 to 1 and a utility function taking real numbers as its
values. 5
Ramsey's all-powerful Bookie is merely a vivid metaphor for the uncertainties of the world confronting any human agent. We act because we believe
that our actions will change in some way the probability-of-occurrence of
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conditions or states of affairs to which we assign positive or negative value.
The choices made by a reflective, psychologically stable agent will reflect
that agent's assessment of the various possible outcomes and his degree of
belief in the various propositions of the form: if I do A, B will result. Ideally,
we can, from a large number of observations of the agent's choices, reconstruct the underlying probability and utility functions guiding those choices.
Ramsey's method can be illustrated by the following step-by-step procedure. First, we must define what Ramsey calls an "ethically neutral proposition." Proposition p is ethically neutral for our subject just in case he does
not care at all whether this proposition is true. A proposition like 'there are
an even number of hairs on Dan Quayle's head' would be ethically neutral
for just about anyone. Second, we must find an ethically neutral proposition
which the subject believes with a subjective probability of exactly 112. We
can tel that p has a probability of 112 for him if there are two states of affairs
a and p6 such that he prefers a to Pbut he is indifferent between the gamble
a if p, otherwise p, and the gamble p if p, otherwise a. For example, my
subjective probability that Dave will beat Mike at tennis is exactly 112 if I'm
indifferent between choosing a ticket which pays $1 if Dave wins, nothing if
Mike does, and a ticket which pays $1 if Mike wins, nothing if Dave does
(assuming that I prefer to be $1 richer).
Once we've found a proposition believed with probability 112, we can use
this proposition to calibrate the subject's utility or desirability scale. A gamble
which offers (what the subject takes to be) a 50% chance of a and a 50%
chance of p will have a value to that subject which is exactly the average of
the values of a and p. If the subject is indifferent between such a gamble and
a state of affairs y, then the value of y must lie exactly half-way between the
values of a and p. Once we arbitrarily fix the origin and unit of our utility
scale, all possible states of affairs can be assigned a definite numerical value
using this method.
Given this utility scale, we can now determine the subject's probability
function, assigning a numerical probability-value to every proposition (including those which are not ethically neutral). Suppose we are trying to
measure the subjective probability for the agent of the proposition p, and
suppose we find states of affairs a, p and y such that the agent is indifferent
between the option of a-for-sure and the gamble: p if p, otherwise y. Assuming that the agent always chooses by selecting the option with the greater
expected value (if there is one), this means that the expected value of the
gamble is equal to the value of a. 7 Letting a, p, and y stand for their own
utility values, and letting p stand for its own subjective probability, we get
the equation:
a

= p . ~ + (l

- p) Y
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Solving for p:
p

= (n - y)/(~ - y)

On this basis, it is possible to prove that degrees of belief, so defined, must
satisfy the axioms of classical probability theory.
Besides assuming the existence of an ethically neutral proposition believed
to degree 112, Ramsey assumes seven other axioms concerning the choices
of the experimental subject in order to prove that this procedure will enable
us to assign unique real numbers as the values of the subject's probability
and utility function. Four of these axioms stipulate that the subject's choices
are mutually coherent. Two others can be thought of as insubstantial idealizations, stipulating that for any real number there is a state of affairs with
exactly that value. The last assumption, the axiom of Archimedes, falls under
neither of these categories. It is a substantial assumption about the subject,
and one which it would not be incoherent for the subject to violate.
Archimedes' axiom is the assumption that any non-empty collection of values
which has an upper bound has a lowest upper bound. This amounts to the
denial that there are infinitely large differences between values. Especially
in the context of a study of religious belief, where ultimate values are at stake,
this is a very dangerous assumption to make.
In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard characterized faith
as an infinite passion. 8 By 'passion,' Kierkegaard clearly has in mind something like desire or striving. It is clearly the impetus of personal decisionmaking. 9 Therefore, we could plausibly interpret Kierkegaard as claiming that
reconciliation with God has infinite value for the religious believer, that is,
a value which is infinitely greater than the value of any state of affairs which
is lacking this crucial feature. Kierkegaard also claims that the degree of
probability of Christianity is irrelevant to the believer (so long as it is greater
than zero, so long as it is at least taken to be possibly true). Ramseyian
decision theory, once it is modified to permit infinite values, can be used to
support Kierkegaard's conclusion.

2. Infinite Values and Hyper-real Numbers
In the 1960's, Abraham Robinson used the techniques of mathematical logic
(especially those developed by Skolem and Henkin) to rehabilitate Leibniz's
intuitive theory of infinitesimals. Robinson showed how a theory which postulates infinitely large and infinitely small ('infinitesimal') quantities can be
made mathematically rigorous. This achievement has great, and as of yet,
largely unrealized, significance for the theory of subjective probability and
subjective value. As I mentioned above, Ramsey had no justification for
excluding the possibility of infinite differences in value; he simply lacked
the mathematical tools for making sense of such a possibility. Consequently,
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he used Archimedes' axiom to sweep the problem away. Robinson's nonstandard analysis should enable us to do better.
In non-standard analysis, besides the usual real numbers, there are also
what are known as 'hyper-real numbers.' Some of these numbers are infinitely
large, some are infinitely small (the infinitesimals), and some are infinitely
close to finite real numbers. Among the infinitely large real numbers, there
are pairs of such numbers which are only finitely far apart, and there are pairs
which are infinitely far apart. In fact, it is possible to find an infinite series
of hyper-real numbers, each of which is infinitely larger than its predecessor.
Likewise, it is possible to find an infinite series of infinitesimals each of
which is infinitely smaller than its predecessor.
The combination of Ramseyian decision theory with non-standard analysis
we can call 'non-standard decision theory.' To illustrate the relevance of
non-standard decision theory to the study of religious belief, let me produce
a more concrete example. Let p be the proposition that I enjoy forever the
beatific vision. Suppose that the difference between the value to me of any
state of affairs a which includes the truth of p and the value and any ~ which
includes the falsity of p is infinitely greater than the difference between the
value of ~ and that of any other state of affairs which includes the falsity of
p, and infinitely greater than the difference between a and any other state of
affairs which includes the truth of p. In such a case, we could say that the
beatific vision is an object of infinite passion for me. If we try to use
Ramsey's method to measure my degree of belief in p, we run into immediate
trouble. Let's assume that the subjective probability of p for me is measurable
by Ramsey's method. Then we can find states of affairs a, ~, and y such that
I am indifferent between a-for-sure and ~ if p, otherwise y. For the gamble
to make sense, ~ must include the truth of p, and y must include the falsity
of p. State a includes either the truth or the falsity of p. Suppose a includes
the falsity of p (so, in a I don't enjoy the beatific vision). As we have seen,
the probability of p is the ratio of a - y over ~ - y. Because the second
difference is infinitely greater than the first (since only in the first case is the
beatific vision at stake), this means that the probability of p must be infinitesimal. In other words, I could be indifferent between a state a in which I
don't enjoy the beatific vision and a gamble which leaves my chances of
enjoying the beatific vision unaffected only if my estimate of the probability
that I will enjoy the beatific vision is infinitesimal. Suppose instead that a
includes the truth of p. Then both a - y and ~ - yare infinitely greater than
a - ~, and so the probability of p must be infinitely close to 1. Therefore, the
probability of p is measurable by Ramsey's method only if it is infinitely
close to zero or infinitely close to 1.
Suppose that the probability of p for me is not infinitesimal. Then there is
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no way that we can find a state a. including the falsity of p which I will prefer
to a gamble which leaves my chances of enjoying the beatific vision unaffected. If the probability of p is also a finite distance from 1 (absolute certainty), then we run into the problem that we cannot find a state a. including
the beatific vision which has a low enough value to enable us to use it in
measuring my confidence in p. A slight modification of Ramsey's method,
however, will overcome this problem. All we must do is find two different
gambles between which I am indifferent: a. if p, otherwise p, and y if p,
otherwise
If the probability of p is not exactly 112, we can use the values
of a., p, y, and 0 to measure the probability of p. Since I am indifferent
between the two gambles, their expected utilities must be equal:

o.

pa + (1 - p)~ = py + (1 - p)

0

Solving this equation for p yields the following equation:
p = (a - y) + (0 - ~)

This solves the problem we just encountered, because now both options
include a mixture or weighted average of the value of the beatific vision and
of the value of its loss. However, there is one more aspect of the impact of
religious passion upon the scale of values discussed by Kierkegaard which
we must consider. Kierkegaard describes Christian faith as involving a "double movement" or "double reflection" of the spirit,1O and so far I have only
taken into account the first movement, the movement of resignation. The
movement of resignation consists in the fact that all differences between
merely worldly goods shrink to the vanishing point in comparison with the
value of being related to God. I have represented this movement by stipulating
that the difference between enjoying the beatific vision and not enjoying it
is infinitely greater than any other difference in value.
The second movement of the spirit, the movement of faith proper, is the
movement by which the affairs of this life, the details of finite history, assume
a new, infinite significance as a result of the promises of God. Although the
value outside God of worldly affairs remains infinitesimal, they take on a
new value inside God for the believer. The tasks and responsibilities of
ordinary life take on an infinite significance as opportunities to serve God.
This second movement of the spirit can be represented in non-standard decision theory in the following way: if a. and p include the existence of a real
God to whom I am related by faith, and y and 0 exclude the existence of such
a God, then, if a. and p have different values at all, the difference between a.
and p is infinitely greater than the difference between y and o. In other words,
the supposition of the existence of God infinitely magnifies the differences
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between values which are at stake as compared to the differences between
possible states of affairs in which God is supposed to be absent.
If we suppose the believer's utility function to reflect both of Kierkegaard's
"movements of the spirit," what happens to the operational or behavioral
significance of my degree of belief in the truth of Christianity? So long as
my degree of belief in Christianity is finite and greater than zero, my degree
of belief has absolutely no behavioral significance! If I am indifferent between a gamble of a if p, ~ otherwise, and one of"{ if p, 0 otherwise [where
'p' now represents the existence of the Christian God], then the probability
of p = (0 - ~)/[a - "() + (0 - ~)], as I calculated above. But now we're supposing
that the difference a - "{ is infinitely greater than the difference 0 - ~. Consequently, the probability of p must be infinitesimal. If it is not in fact
infinitesimal, then that means that we will be unable to find two gambles of
this kind between which I will be indifferent, and the probability which p has
for me will not be measurable by Ramsey's method. In other words, the value
which my degree of belief in Christianity actually takes will have absolutely
no behavioral significance.
Thus, the distinguishing feature of faith is not that the difference between
eternal salvation and loss is infinitely greater than the difference between any
two this-worldly values (the crux of Pascal's wager), but that the introduction
of God magnifies infinitely the differences in value between this-worldly
matters, as compared with the differences that would exist for the believer in
the absence of God. By saying that the introduction of God magnifies the
differences in value between the various states of this world, I do not mean
to imply that the relative value of these states is unaffected by this process.
What I judge to be important and valuable, given the supposition that God
exists, and what I would judge to be important, given the contradictory
supposition, would of course be quite different. Acts of kindness toward my
wife would be relatively important on either suppositions; acts of Christian
witness relatively more important on the second than the first.

3. A Kierkegaardian Account of Faith
What I am supposing to be characteristic of the values of the believer is this:
any difference in value between possible states of the world in which the
existence of God is given is infinitely greater than any difference between
possible states of the world from which God is absent. Thus, as a believer, if
I suppose that there is no God, then the values which are at stake whenever
I make any decision, no matter how momentous or how trivial, are infinitesimal in comparison to the values which would be at stake were I to suppose
the existence of God (here, it is the "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," the
"God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" who matters). Every decision, no
matter how trivial the matter, is for the believer of infinitely greater signifi-
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cance given his existence than it would be given his absence, because, given
the existence of God, every decision affords the opportunity of serving God,
of drawing closer to Him, of bearing fruitful witness to the world of His love.
This same analysis can be used to construct a response to the Pyrrhonian
skeptic, the skeptic who calls into question the existence of a world outside
one's own perceptions. The application of this analysis to skepticism about
the "external world" can shed some light on its analogous application to the
skeptic about religion. A sensible, man-in-the-street response to the Pyrrhonian
skeptic might go something like this:
If solipsism, the non-existence of the external world, were really true, then

nothing I care about deeply would be at stake in any of my decisions. My
own real health and prosperity, the real welfare of my family and friends, the
real success of projects and institutions with which I have identified myselfthese things are infinitely more important to me than a mere succession of
appearances in my own mind. Therefore, so long as there is the slightest
chance that this external world familiar to me through my senses really exists,
it is rational for me to base all my decisions on the hypothesis that it does
exist, to act, in fact, as if I were absolutely certain of this hypothesis.
This is not a refutation of skepticism, but it is a compelling response to
Pyrrhonian skepticism, to the skeptic who believes that one's doubt should
have behavioral implications. The academic skeptic who, like Hume, recognizes the impossibility of demonstrative knowledge of the principles of common sense but who acts like other men as though he were certain of them is
untouched by this analysis. Likewise, decision theory points out the irrationality (for the believer) of Pyrrhonian skepticism about religion but leaves the
academic counterpart unscathed.
It is plausible, however, to suppose that every difference in value which
presupposes God's existence is infinitely greater for the believer than any
difference which presupposes His non-existence? For example, does the difference between my eating a candy bar this afternoon and my not eating one
really take on infinitely greater significance once the existence of God is
assumed? I think the answer is clearly, Yes. Anyone who is sure that the
answer must be No or who is bewildered at how this can be so exhibits a
fundamental failure to comprehend the significance of God for the believer.
Whatever the believer does, no matter how trivial it may be in worldly
estimation, is something which is either done "unto the Lord" (for the glory
of God, for the deepening of the believer's relation to God) or is done at the
cost of missing an opportunity to do this, and every good which is received
as a blessing from God. If a candy bar provides some atom of innocent
pleasure, the significance of that pleasure is infinitely magnified by supposing
it to be a gift from God, a token of His love. If a choice concerns the
disposition of some minute resource, its significance is infinitely magnified
by supposing the disposition of this resource to be a responsibility of a
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divinely-commissioned stewardship. I don't mean to suggest that the believer
agonizes over every trivial decision, worrying about which course of action
possesses this infinite value. A believer in such a state represents a pathological condition of faith. Rather, the normal believer joyfully seizes every opportunity to act as an opportunity to walk with God.
Isn't it wildly implausible, though, to suppose that the difference between
two barely distinguishable pleasures for one creature, on the supposition that
God exists, is infinitely more important to the believer than whether or not
millions of innocent people suffer horrible deaths, on the supposition that
God does not exist? Surely the intrinsic value difference in the latter case,
quite apart from any theological aspects, is greater than the difference in the
former case, whatever its theological ramifications.
Frankly, I am unmoved by this objection. The significance of the death of
innocent persons, as compared with other matters, is increased, not diminished, by the supposition of the existence of the Christian God, since this
supposition entails that all persons are created in the image of God and
endowed by God with the right to life. I am only claiming that for the believer,
the supposition of the truth of the Christian story confers upon all matters a
magnitude of significance which is infinitely greater than whatever intrinsic
significance they may have had, apart from their relationship to God.
From the perspective of faith, every finite value is radicalIy relativized and
conditioned. That is, the new value which a finite condition obtains in relation
to God overwhelms, by its infinitely greater magnitude, any significance
which that condition might have had in isolation from God. To treat the
intrinsic (God-independent) differences in value of finite conditions as equal
in magnitude to the differences they acquire in relation to the will and the
glory of God is to be guilty of idolatry (in its most general form).
However, if you are unpersuaded that the supposition of God's existence
can make such an infinite difference to the value of trivial matters of taste
and preference, it is possible for me to adopt a somewhat weaker claim,
without substantially altering the account of faith offered here. I could claim
that, whenever God's existence makes any difference at all to the relative
values of two states of affairs, it makes an infinitely great difference. This
would enable me to concede that some matters, those for which the existence
or non-existence of God has no bearing, remain of only finite significance,
even on the supposition of God's existence. Perhaps God's existence makes
no difference at all to the relative value of eating a candy bar or an ice cream
cone. In that case I could admit that the difference between the two states of
affairs, even given the existence of God, is less significant than some more
important issue, even given God's non-existence.
Let ex. be the value of eating the candy bar in a world in which God exists,
and ~ be the value of eating the same bar in a godless world. Let y be the
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value of eating the cone in a world in which God exists,. and 0 be the value
of the same state in a godless world. Since by hypothesis, God's existence
makes no difference in this case, a - y is equal to \3 - o. Hence, (a - y) + (0 - \3)
is equal to zero. Returning again to the Ramsey equation discussed above,
p= (a-y)+(o-~)

we can see that p, the subjective probability of God's existence, cannot be
measured, since the denominator of the equation is equal to zero. Thus, this
concession would not change the fact that the believer's subjective probability of God's existence lacks behavioral significance.
The Kierkegaardian account of faith, as I have construed it, consists of the
claim that the following two conditions are both necessary and sufficient
conditions for faith in Christianity: (1) the subjective probability of Christianity is finite and non-zero, II and (2) the difference between any two states
of affairs including the truth of Christianity is either zero or is infinitely
greater than the difference between any two states of affairs excluding the
truth of Christianity. Is there any reason to think that these two conditions
are really necessary? Suppose the subjective probability of Christianity for
someone is greater than one-half, but he does not satisfy the second condition
above. Would it be right to say that he lacks faith? I think so. Unless the
subjective probability of Christianity is one (or infinitely close to one), such
a person will bring a certain kind of calculation to every decision of life,
weighing whether each sacrifice is warranted, given the subjective probability
of Christianity for him, which kind of calculation is incompatible with an
attitude of genuine faith. Such a person's commitment to acting as if Christianity is true is heavily qualified and hedged. This hedging will not characterize one for whom the subjective probability of Christianity is one, but I
do not think that such epistemic certainty is at all typical of the Christian
believer. Moreover, the rationality of such absolute certainty is incompatible
with the doctrines of the hiddenness of God and the obscurity to our present
faculties of His revelation (I Corinthians 13).
Are the two Kierkegaardian conditions really sufficient for the existence of
faith? Why not add that a believer must, in addition to those two conditions,
meet the further condition of having a SUbjective probability of at least onehalf that Christianity is true? As I demonstrated above, given that one meets
the two Kierkegaardian conditions, whether one's subjective probability of
the truth of Christianity takes any particular finite value has absolutely no
behavioral significance. There are two ways to take this fact. Firstly, one
could suppose that Ramsey's method provides an operational definition of
the notion of 'subjective probability.' In this case, one would conclude that
it makes no sense to ask whether a Kierkegaardian believer's subjective
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probability of the truth of Christianity is greater or less than one-half. Of
course, if the claim that it is greater than one-half makes no sense, then one
cannot add this as a third condition to be met. Alternatively, one could suppose that 'subjective probability' refers to some underlying cognitive state
which is partially but not exhaustively revealed in behavior. (I prefer this
second option.) In this case, it does make sense to ask whether the person
who meets the two Kierkegaardian conditions also assigns Christianity a
subjective probability greater than one-half. Ramsey's method gives the operational significance of, but does not define, 'subjective probability.'
Nonetheless, no component of the definition of faith can lack behavioral
significance, and, therefore, the two Kierkegaardian conditions are sufficient,
since any further condition would be lacking such significance. In each of
the three passages in the New Testament in which the nature of faith is set
forth (Romans 4, Hebrews 11, James 2), the emphasis is on faith as demonstrated by action. This doesn't entail that we should identify having faith with
displaying any sort of pattern of behavior, but it does indicate that the reference of 'faith' is fixed l2 in the Biblical tradition by presenting certain paradigmatic cases of faith-determined action. In other words, one can think of
the biblical authors as offering the following sort of "definition" of faith:
Faith = that state of mind (whatever it may be) which caused Abraham to
be willing to sacrifice Isaac, and caused Rahab to hide the Israelite
spies in her home, etc.

If Abraham, Rahab, and the other heroes of faith satisfied the two
Kierkegaardian conditions (as I believe they did), then any further condition
pertaining to their subjective probabilities can be no part of faith, since no
such condition would have any role in explaining why Abraham bound Isaac,
why Rahab hid the spies, etc.
Of course, faith is also displayed by verbal action, e.g., by confessing the
creed. Can one who meets the two Kierkegaardian conditions but for whom
the subjective probability of Christianity is quite low confess without hypocrisy, "I believe in God the Father, maker of heaven and earth ... "? To think
that he cannot do so is to beg the very question at issue, viz., does belief (in
this context) have anything to do with the relevant subjective probability's
being greater than one-half? If the two Kierkegaardian conditions are sufficient for faith, then one who meets them may truthfully confess, "I believe."
Moreover, such a person should not hesitate to assert the truth of these
theological propositions, since the significance of truth-telling is, along with
all other values, radically dependent for him upon the truth of these very
propositions.
Moreover, even if there does exist such a real cognitive state which is the
subjective probability of the creed for the believer, this state is a highly
theoretical object. Lacking any behavioral significance, it might also lack
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introspectibility and indeed any sort of phenomenological trace. In fact, it
seems quite reasonable to suppose that the state of faith would be phenomenologically indistinguishable from certainty, since the propositions of the
Christian faith guide the believer's actions in exactly the same way they
would if their subjective probability were one. The Christian faith provides
the believer with a frame of reference within which all decisions are made:
its degree of probability is never a relevant issue and thus naturally fades
from view. The only residual effect of a low subjective probability might be
the ability to recognize, as many Christians have, that the evidence for the
truth of Christianity is, objectively speaking, quite inconclusive. But such a
recognition is surely compatible with a sincere profession of the creed.
Finally, I want to reiterate and make quite clear that I am not giving an
anti-realist, anti-metaphysical, deflationary account of the content of theological propositions. The cognitive content of the creed is not to be identified
with its functional significance in the life of the believer-with, for example,
the way in which it figures in the structure of the believer's utility function-,
any more than it is to be identified with the means of verifying it. Recent
work in philosophical logic, pioneered by Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke,
has produced what is known as the "causal theory of reference."!3 This theory
makes intelligible the possibility that the content of our beliefs transcends
the function which those beliefs have in the internal economy of the human
mind. In fact, I would argue that a deflationary, anti-metaphysical account of
the content of theological propositions would make it unintelligible how such
propositions could have the role they do in structuring the utility function of
the believer. It is precisely because God is conceived of as a transcendent,
infinite Being, the Creator and Redeemer of the world, that the supposition
of His existence can make such an infinitely great difference to the believer's
assessments of value.
I would like to conclude this section by comparing my account with some
recent work by Alvin Plantinga on the epistemic status of religious beliefs.
Plantinga has argued that there is no sustainable objection to the claim that
the central propositions of theism and even of Christianity may be "properly
basic" for the believer, that is, that the believer is well within his "cognitive
rights" in accepting such propositions as true without any evidence or reason.
He has quite effectively refuted efforts by defenders of a Cartesian or empiricist foundationalism in epistemology to demonstrate that such propositions as 'God exists' may not be included in the cognitive foundations of a
rational individual. In later work, Planting a has identified belief in these
theological propositions with the state in which these propositions have a
subjective probability of one. In contrast, on my account beliefs (including
properly basic beliefs) would come in two kinds: those which are epistemically grounded (having a subjecti ve probability of one, or infinitely close to
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one), and those which are pragmatically grounded (propositions with respect
to which the individual meets the two Kierkegaardian conditions). As I argued
above, Plantinga's view that religious propositions are epistemically
grounded for the believer conflicts with the doctrines of the hiddenness of
God in the present age.
A defender of Plantinga might respond that my account accounts badly for
the phenomenology of religious belief. The Christian believer does experience a kind of assurance or certainty of the truth of Christianity. Nonetheless,
this experience can be plausibly accounted for by my account. The experience
of certainty comes about as a result of a process of framing. When one acts
habitually and constantly as if Christianity were true, when one consistently
ignores all contrary possibilities in reaching any decision, the truth of Christianity provides a kind of frame within which all cognitive activity takes
place. Typically, Christianity will be experienced as having the same quality
as any proposition whose probability conditional on the frame is one. This
will, of course, include all those propositions whose absolute subjective probability is one. Thus, the phenomenological similarity of pragmatically and
epistemically grounded beliefs. At the same time, it is important to note that
there is a phenomenological difference between religious convictions and
apprehensions of self-evident truths, a difference which becomes evident in
times of religious crisis. At such times, the pragmatic frame provided by
Christianity is called into question. It is a peculiar advantage of my account
that this phenomenological difference, as well as the similarity, can be accounted for.

4. Contrast with Pascal sWager
The idea of positing infinite differences in values in glvmg a decisiontheoretic account of religious faith obviously owes a great deal to Pascal's
discussion of the Wager in his Pensees. Nonetheless, my Kierkegaardian
account of faith differs from Pascal's in two important ways. First of all, the
analysis does not depend on the claim that eternal salvation is infinitely
greater than any worldly value, as does Pascal's. Instead, the crucial claim is
that differences in value between this-worldly states of affairs are infinitely
greater for the believer on the religious hypothesis than on its denial.
Kierkegaard claimed that the touchstone of faith is to bring the "God-idea"
into relation with every detail of the finite world. 14
Secondly, the Kierkegaardian analysis of faith does not entail the necessity
of manipulating one's intellectual judgments in order to bring them into line
with one's religious affirmation. Pascal argued that it was rational to sacrifice
one's rationality, one's intellectual integrity, for the sake of the greater value
of salvation. In contrast, on Kierkegaard's account, faith in the objectively
improbable does not require any corruption of the intellect. One can have
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perfect faith, all the while recogmzmg that what one affirms in faith is
improbable on the evidence. In fact, Kierkegaard regarded the courage which
is required to launch out in the venture of faith in the face of this intellectually
acknowledged improbability as the principal virtue of faith. "The conclusion
of belief is not so much a conclusion as a resolution, and it is for this reason
that belief excludes doubt."15

5. Implications for Apologetics
One function of traditional apologetics remains crucial on my account: the
task of responding to purported refutations of theism or Christianity, such as
the argument from evil. If the opponent can demonstrate that Christianity is
false, then its subjective probability should be zero (or at least infinitesimal)
and the rationality of religious belief collapses, whatever one's utility function. Positive natural theology, the attempt to demonstrate or increase the
probability of theism by appealing to its confirmation by available evidence,
would, in contrast, be lacking any relevance to faith. This does not imply that
such investigations may not be valuable in their own right, as a legitimate
branch of science or philosophy. It simply implies that the rationality of
religious belief does not depend upon such results, and would not be affected
by their absence.
There still is a legitimate place for positive apologetics for Christianity and
other specific religious traditions, however. The believer will be concerned
about which of those traditions which are (by virtue of the believer's utility
function) live options is most probable. A religious tradition is a live option
for a Christian believer if the theological facts which it posits have the same
order of significance for the believer as do the central facts posited by Christianity. If a competing religious tradition posits the existence of a transcendent god or gods in relation to whom the facts of mundane existence would
take on the same kind of significance as they would have if Christianity were
true, then the believer must choose a way of life which takes into cognizance
the relative probabilities of the competing traditions.
Moreover, I would not want to go so far as to deny that the study and
presentation of evidence of design and of reported miracles are of no relevance to faith in theism itself. These can help to excite wonder and awe, to
fix in the mind a conception of the majesty and grandeur of God which would
otherwise be missing. And, it is only by forming the conception of the possibility of such a wonderful God that the transformation of the utility function
which constitutes the second component of faith may be effected.
The principal implication of my account is, not that the intellectual estimation of probabilities be downplayed, but that the affective appreciation of
value be given its right of place. This should not be understood as any kind
of romantic rebellion against reason or the intellect, as a leap into irrational-
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ity, subjectivity, or the unrestrained will-to-believe. In fact, religious belief
as I conceive it conforms to the very paradigm of sober rationality: the
calculus of decision theory. Nor is there any unleashing of idiosyncratic
subjectivity. The judgments of infinite differences in value which lie at the
root of religious belief are not unreasonable or idiosyncratic. Admittedly,
modern decision theory, with its origins in Hobbes and Bentham, was conceived in the sin of a purely subjective theory of value. However, this subjectivism is not essential to the mathematical tool itself. One can argue that
is unnatural and unreasonable not to assign values in such a way as to support
Christian belief. Such argument would be one of the central tasks of Christian
apologetics, as I conceive it.
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